John P. Dority v. Jeanne D. Dority v. Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
John P. Dority v. Jeanne D. Dority v. Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errorsB.L. Dart; Attorneys for Defendant-RespondentDavid M. Swope
and John K. Mangum; Attorneys for Appellants
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Dority v. Dority, No. 17376 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2532
4£ •. ;;; 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. DORITY, ) 
) 
?laintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) Appeal No. 17376 
) 
vEANNE D. DORITY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent.) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN ARD 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, .JUDGE 
·.·.~'~i:': 
David M. ~ .. '·):.·· 
John K. ~lili~. . •; 
B. L. Dart 
DART & STEGALL 
430 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
NIELSl!lll r. 
1100 Bene.ii.Ci 
36 South St.a .• 
Salt Lake Ci tY / 
Att~ 
Appel~·. 
' '~"...:-:•. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AWARDING THE 
ENTIRE OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE DEVON REAL 
PROPERTY TO RESPONDENT . . . . . . . . . . . 
A. The Court Erred by Not Applying Pennsylvania 
1 
1 
4 
5 
11 
11 
Real Property Law. . . . . . . . . 11 
B. In the Alternative, if This Court Does Not 
Seem the Pennsylvania Law to be Applicable 
to the Devon Real Property, The Trial Court 
Should be Directed to Award to Appellant The 
Equivalent Value of the Separate Property 
Appellant Brought Into the Marriage Which was 
Traced to the Acquisition of the Devon Real 
Property. . . . . . . . . . . 14 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR WAS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE VACATED 1 7 
CONCLUSION 23 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Barber v. Barber, 51 Cal. 2d 244, 331 P.2d 
628 (1958) 
Burton v. Burton, 23 Ariz. App. 159, 531 P.2d 
204 (1975) 
DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1967) 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) 
Gramme v. Grarnme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) 
Haws v. Haws, 615 P.2d 978 (Nev. 1980) 
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974) 
Jesperson v. Jesoerson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) 
Lykiardopoulos v. Lvkiardopoulos, 453 Pa. 290, 309 
A.2d 548 (1973) 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974) 
Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) 
Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 329 A.2d 483 (Pa. 1974) 
Statutes 
Page(s) 
12 
12 
11-12 
11 
20 
12 
15-16 
15 
13 
11 
12, 21 
18,19 
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §103 (as amended by Act No. 19 
1980-26, quoted from Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative 
Service, 1980, Pamphlet No. 1) 
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §501 (as amended by Act No. 19 
1980-26, quoted from Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative 
Service, 1980, Pamphlet No. 1) 
68 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §501 (Purdon) (Main volume and 12-13,14 
1980 Pocket Supp.) 
68 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §503 (Purdon) 14 
ii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. DORITY, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JEANNE D. DORITY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent.) 
Appeal No. 17376 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce brought by the 
plaintiff-appellant, John P. Dority, against his wife, Jeanne 
D. Dority, the defendant-respondent, who appeared and 
counter-claimed for divorce. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of this matter was held on August 1, 1980, 
before the Honorable James s. Sawaya (Record, hereinafter "R." 
at 117). On August 4, 1980, the court issued its slip opinion 
in the matter granting a decree of divorce to each party and 
making the following division of property: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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To the respondent--
1. The real property on Schoolhouse Lane in Devon, 
Pennsylvania. 
2. 850 shares of Sperry Corporation stock and 100 
shares of I.B.M. stock. 
3. A fund of about $2,000.00 in a Pennsylvania 
checking account designated "Devon House Fund." 
4. Her retirement fund with TIAA-CREF. 
5. All personal property including automobiles, 
furniture, furnishings, etc. then in the name or 
possession of respondent. 
6. Alimony in the sum of $500 per month for a period 
of 36 months commencing September, 1980. 
To the appellant--
1. The real property in respondent's name in Salt 
Lake County. 
2. The remaining 844 shares of stock in the Sperry 
Corporation and the remaining 120 shares of stock in 
I.B.M. 
3. Stock in United Abestos Limited. 
4. His vested retirement fund held by the Sperry 
Corporation. 
5. All personal property then in the possession or 
name of the appellant. 
Each party was to bear his or her own costs and attorneys' fees 
(R. 115-16). Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
-2-
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and the final Decree of Divorce, as prepared by counsel for 
respondent, were filed August, 11, 1980 (R. 127-34). On August 
18, 1980, appellant filed his Notice of Objections to Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and to the Decree of Divorce along 
with his Motion for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative, for 
Amendment of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree of Divorce (R. 135-39). A hearing on these objections 
and on the Motion for a New Trial was held on September 17, 
1980 (R. 140, 295-312). Among other objections, it was noted 
that Finding 6(b) gave an unduly depressed figure for the 
equity in the home at Devon, Pennsylvania, in part because the 
equity had been reduced by the sum of $17,000 for a personal 
loan made to respondent from her mother purportedly for the 
purpose of maintaining and improving the Devon real property 
which sum counsel for respondent admitted was not properly a 
lien against the property (R. 297-99, Defendant's Exhibit 8). 
Another objection made was the lack of sufficient evidence to 
support the award of alimony in paragraph 9 of the Findings 
(R. 301-04), These and all other objections to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, with the exception of the 
correction of two typographical errors, were denied (R. 142). 
on the Motion for New Trial, it was urged that the 
court had failed to adequately consider the requirements of 
Pennsylvania law with respect to the Pennsylvania real 
property, the house and lot located at Devon, Pennsylvania 
(R. 308-09). It was also urged that the evidence did not 
-3-
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support the award of alimony (R. 301-03), and that the court 
erred in not giving more consideration to Pennsylvania Law, 
which up until one month before trial, did not allow for any 
award of alimony after a decree of divorce in the circumstances 
presented here and which provided that suits begun before the 
effective date of the new law should generally continue under 
the old law, except "upon application granted" (R. 306-08). 
The court rejected these contentions, and specifically stated; 
"I don't think the Pennsylvania law should apply in this 
situation (R. 312-142). 
Additional proposed findings were also submitted by 
counsel for appellant, but these were never adopted by the 
court (R. 311-12, 144-45). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed October 16, 1980 (R. 
147). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests that this Court reverse and vacate 
that part of the Findings and the Decree of the trial court 
which awarded the entire equity of the Pennsylvania real 
property to the respondent and which provided for an award of 
alimony. Appellant also requests that this Court remand this 
case to the trial court with an order directing the trial court 
to declare that the parties are tenants in common of equal 
one-half shares in value of the Pennsylvania real property, or, 
-4-
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in the alternative, to declare that appellant is entitled to 
additional property equivalent in value to $23,000, the sum 
appellant contributed, from his separate property which he 
brought to the marriage, to the purchase of the real property 
in Devon, Pennsylvania. Appellant further requests that this 
Court declare on remand that respondent is not entitled to any 
alimony. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married in Binghamton, New York, on 
April 15, 1956 (R. 202). The appellant was then 31 years old 
(R. 202). The respondent was three years younger, as the 
appellant was 55 and the respondent was 52 years old at the 
time of trial (R. 202, 257). 
At the time of the marriage of the parties, the 
appellant was a patent attorney employed by the International 
Business Machines Corporation in Endicott, New York, at an 
annual salary of $12,667.20 (R. 202-03). He had received a law 
degree in 1950 from the University of Wisconsin, had been 
admitted to practice law in the states of Wisconsin and Iowa, 
and had been registered to practice in the United States Patent 
Office as a patent attorney since early 1952 (R. 202-03). At 
the time of the marriage, the appellant owned a house and a lot 
located in Endicott, New York, that had a value of about 
$16,000 and was free and clear of any obligation and, by his 
-5-
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own unrefuted testimony, appellant had approximately $26,000.00 
in other assets, held principally in the form of government 
bonds (R. 204-05, 242-43). Although respondent testified she 
did not know of appellant's $26,000 in assets at the time of 
the marriage (259-60), she never denied that he had such assets 
and she admitted that he owned the house in Endicott (R. 283). 
The respondent, at the time of the marriage, was four 
credits short of receiving her Bachelor's Degree at the 
University of Minnesota, had been working as a reporter at a 
daily newspaper at a monthly take-home salary of about $500, 
which employment she quit about two weeks after the marriage, 
and she brought according to her own testimony at most $500 in 
savings into the marriage plus a wedding present of $500 from 
her parents (R. 258-60). Four children were born as issue of 
the marriage in the years 1956 through 1960, and the two 
youngest children, twins, were nineteen years old at the time 
of the divorce trial (R. 205-259). As these children have all 
reached their majority, there is no issue as to their custody 
or support. 
In 1960, the appellant changed employers and began 
working for the Sperry Rand Corporation, and as a result of 
that change, the parties moved from the appellant's house in 
Endicott, New York, to Rye, New York (R. 206-07). Appellant 
purchased a lot in Rye and constructed a home on that lot using 
funds received from the sale of the house in Endicott, the 
assets he brought into the marriage in 1956, and by taking a 
-6-
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mortgage out for approximately $30,000 (R. 206). The real 
property in Rye was owned only in the name of the appellant (R. 
207). 
In 1966, when appellant's employer moved from New York 
City to a suburb of Philadelphia, the appellant moved himself 
and his family to another Philadelphia suburb by the name of 
Devon. He there acquired a house on Schoolhouse Lane for a 
down payment of $10,000 and by taking out a mortgage of $25,000 
(R. 207-08). The down payment came from the proceeds of the 
sale of the house in Rye, New York (R. 208). The sale of the 
Rye property netted about $40,000 after payment of the $30,000 
mortgage and commissions, which $40,000 was about the same 
amount invested by appellant from his separate property in the 
Rye property, of which another $10,000 was used to make 
improvements in the Devon property in the years 1967 through 
1972 (R. 202-09). The Devon property was placed in the name of 
both parties as tenants by the entireties (R. 227-28). 
The parties have been separated since August 7, 1972, 
on which date the appellant returned home from work to find 
that his wife and children had left and taken most of the 
household furniture and furnishings with them. Shortly 
thereafter, a court order was entered requiring the appellant 
to pay the sum of $1,100 per month for the support of his wife 
and four children, of which $400 was allocated to the support 
of the wife (R. 209-210, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). At that time 
the appellant had a gross salary of $3,000 per month or $36,000 
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per year (R. 210-211, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). The appellant 
continued to reside in and to make the mortgage payments on the 
house on Schoolhouse Lane in Devon until the latter part of 
1978 (R. 211). He also used another $3,000 from the proceeds 
of the sale of the Rye property to make repairs on the Devon 
property after the separation of the parties (R. 225). 
After a separation of almost five years, the appellant 
filed for divorce in Pennsylvania in 1977 (R. 212). At that 
time, appellant sought and obtained a court order reducing his 
support obligations to his wife from $400 to $250 per month and 
eliminating the requirement of support for the two older boys 
who had reached the age of majority (R. 217, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 6). The respondent had begun full time employment in 
1976 (R. 266). Moreover, the oldest child of the parties, Jim, 
resided with appellant at the home on Schoolhouse Lane from 
1975 until the appellant left in late 1978. Also, the second 
son, Ben, resided with them from January 1978 until the 
appellant had to move to Salt Lake (R. 282). Also, the 
appellant has contributed to the support of these children 
while attending college even after they gained their majority 
(R. 282-83). 
In August of 1978, the appellant learned that to continue 
employment with his employer, the Sperry Corporation, he would 
have to relocate to Salt Lake City (R. 215). At that time, the 
parties attempted to negotiate a settlement of the Pennsylvania 
divorce proceeding which the respondent was contesting and to 
-8-
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negotiate a property settlement but no agreement was reached 
( R. 267-69). 
At the time of the appellant's involuntary transfer in 
late 1978, he was earning a gross salary of just slightly aver 
$46,000 (R. 217). Upon moving ta Salt Lake, the appellant 
acquired a home at 3621 Oakview Drive for a purchase price of 
$80,000 (R. 222). This was financed by borrowing a down 
payment of $27,000 for which appellant's stocks were pledged as 
collateral ta Merrill Lynch, and by granting a mortgage to the 
bank far the balance (R. 222, 230). This property was not 
acquired with any of the proceeds from the real property 
located in Devon as the appellant has received no proceeds from 
the Devon property (R. 222). 
In June, 1979, after appellant had established 
residency in Utah, and because of the frustration he had 
experienced with respect ta the Pennsylvania divorce action, 
which by then had dragged on far some two years, and fearing 
that now that he was in Utah he would not be able to help move 
it along, appellant filed for divorce in Utah (R. 218). 
Respondent submitted ta the jurisdiction of the Utah court and 
there is no issue as to the jurisdiction of this state over the 
persons of both parties. 
After appellant left the house in Devon in late 1978, 
respondent did some general cleanup and repair work on the 
place and began renting it out on July 1, 1979, at a rate of 
$600 per month (R. 270-72). As of July 1, 1980, this rent was 
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increased to $650 per month (R. 271-72). Three hundred dollars 
of that amount is net income after payments of taxes, mortgage 
payments, and maintenance (R. 272). Respondent claimed at 
trial to have borrowed about $17,000 from her mother to bring 
all mortgage and tax payments on the Devon property current and 
to make repairs, but that only about half of this personal loan 
had been put into the restoration of the house or the making of 
payments on it (R. 270-71). On defendant's Exhibit 8, admitted 
over the objection of counsel for appellant that the listing 
and valuation of assets was not properly supported by 
foundation testimony or other evidence (R. 278), the listing of 
the assets of the parties improperly shows the $17,000 loan as 
a reduction of the equity in the Devon real property (R. 
297-98), which equity is further understated by the fact that 
the appraisal of the Devon property dates from November 1979, 
almost ten months before the trial (Deposition of Laurence s. 
Scott at pages 13-14, published at R. 256). 
Defendant's Exhibit 9, admitted for illustrative 
purposes only (R. 274), reflects the income of the parties at 
the time of trial. It shows that even without support from 
appellant, respondent had a net monthly expendable income, 
after taxes, of $1,332.02. 
-10-
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AWARDING THE ENTIRE 
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE DEVON REAL PROPERTY 
TO RESPONDENT. 
A. The Court Erred by Not Applying Pennsylvania Real Property 
Law. 
It is an often quoted principle that: 
it is both the duty and the prerogative of this 
court in an equitable action to review the law and 
the facts and make its own findings and substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial court. 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974). 
However, appellant is quite cognizant of the discretion of a 
trial court in a divorce action to adjust financial and 
property interests, of the presumption of the validity that 
usually attaches to the judgment of a trial court in such a 
situation, and of appellant's burden to show on appeal that: 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings as made; or there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
Id. See also English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1977). However, as this court has also noted, the discretion 
of the trial court: 
is not without limit nor immune from correction on 
review, if that is warranted. Due to the 
seriousness of such proceedings and the vital effect 
they have on people's lives, it is also the 
responsibility of this court to carefully survey 
-11-
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what is done, and while the determinations of the 
trial court are given deference and not disturbed 
lightly, changes should be made if that seems 
essential to the accomplishment and the desired 
objectives of the decree . 
DeRose v. DeRose 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221, 222 (1967). See 
also Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). 
In the present action, although it is undisputed that 
the trial court had jurisdiction over the persons of both 
parties, an important part of the property to be divided was 
the real property located on Schoolhouse Lane in Devon, 
Pennsylvania. It is a well accepted proposition of law that a 
court hearing a marriage dissolution proceeding should look to 
the law of the situs of real property to determine how the 
property or its proceeds should be allocated. Haws v. Haws, 
615 P.2d 978, 981 (Nev. 1980), Burton v. Burton, 23 Ariz. App. 
159, 531 P.2d 204, 207 (1975), Barber v. Barber, 51 Cal.2d 244, 
331 P.2d 628, 631 (1958). This principle is particularly 
applicable to the Devon real property inasmuch as it was used 
as the marital residence from the time of its acquisition in 
1966 to the time the parties separated in 1972. It should also 
be noted that the appellant continued to live there until late 
1978 and since that time respondent has taken charge of the 
property and has rented it out since July of 1979. 
Both at trial and on the Motion for New Trial, counsel 
for appellant asked the trial court to take judicial notice of 
and to apply Section 501 of Title 68 of the Pennsylvania 
Consolidated Statutes (R. 287-88, 308-309) which reads: 
-12-
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Whenever any husband and wife, hereafter 
[the statute dates to 1927] acquiring property as 
tenants by entireties, shall be divorced, they shall 
thereafter hold such property as tenants in common 
of equal one-half shares in value and either of them 
may bring suit against the other to have the 
property sold and the proceeds divided between 
them. [The version quoted is an amended version 
effective June 27, 1980.] 
The trial court's decree dividing the property of the 
parties clearly did not apply this statute, for it awarded all 
interest in the Devon property to the respondent. Moreover, at 
the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, the court stated: 
"I don't think the Pennsylvania law should apply in this 
situation, because every case law or statute holds otherwise" 
(R. 312). It is not clear what law '"holding otherwise" was had 
in mind by the court because the cases cited above squarely 
hold to the contrary. Appellant has not been able to locate 
any Utah law that is on point that would support the contention 
of the trial court. 
It should also be noted that 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann.§501 (Purdon) has been held by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania to be strictly applicable according to its terms. 
Lykiardopoulos v. Lykiardopoulos, 453 Pa. 290, 309 A.2d 548 
(1973). In Lykiardopoulos, the ex-husband, after a divorce, 
sought a partition of property held in a tenancy by the 
entireties during the existence of the marriage. Among other 
things, his former wife argued that before dividing the 
proceeds received from the sale of the property, she was 
entitled to expenses she had incurred to preserve and protect 
-13-
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the property since the date of the parties separation. 
Applying 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. §503 which provided for only 
recorded liens to be deducted before division of proceeds, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the expenses incurred by 
the former wife cold not be deducted before division of the 
proceeds unless they had been reduced to a recorded lien 
against the property. 
In the action at bar, the trial court should have 
similarly applied 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §501 (Purdon) so as 
to declare the parties tenants in common with equal one-half 
shares in value to the Devon real property without any 
deduction for the personal loan respondent received from her 
mother. This the trial court failed to do. For having thus 
failed to properly apply the Pennsylvania law which governs the 
disposition of the Devon parcel of real property, the trial 
court's findings and decree should be reversed and this court 
should remand the case to the trial court with an order 
directing that the trial court apply the law of Pennsylvania as 
explained. 
B. In the Alternative, if this Court Does Not Deem the 
Pennsylvania Law to be Applicable to the Devon Real Property, 
The Trial Court Should be Directed to Award to Appellant The 
Equivalent Value of the Separate Property Appellant Brought 
Into the Marriage Which was Traced to the Acquisition of the 
Devon Real Property. 
-14-
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Even if this Court does not apply the Pennsylvania 
Statute referenced above, Utah case law demands that appellant 
be awarded the equivalent value of his separate property 
brought to the marriage which was used in the acquisition of 
the Devon real property. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 
(Utah 1980), Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974). 
In Jesperson, this Court noted as recently as last year that 
the "parties' respective contributions to the marriage" is an 
important factor to consider in making a property division in a 
divorce action. In that case the wife brought to the marriage 
assets valued at over $20,000 while the husband brought nothing 
to the marriage. A mobile home acquired during the marriage 
was found to have been financed with some $19,000 that were the 
separate funds of the wife. Upon dissolution of the marriage, 
this court affirmed the propriety of the trial court's action 
in awarding to the wife an amount equal to the quanitity of her 
separate funds used to acquire the mobile home before dividing 
the remaining proceeds from the sale of the mobile home in the 
following language: "It was not unreasonable for the court to 
permit plaintiff to withdraw from the marriage property the 
equivalent of those assets plaintiff brought into the 
marriage." 610 P.2d at 328. 
In Humphreys, the principal asset acquired during the 
marriage was a home used as the marital residence. The 
defendant husband admitted that the home was purchased with at 
least $3,000 that had been the separate property of the 
-15-
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plaintiff-wife. The trial court held that any proceeds from 
the sale of the home remaining after all mortgages, liens, 
judgments, and debts had been paid, were to be divided equally 
between the parties. This Court modified that decree so as to 
require reimbursement to the plaintiff of the $3,400 she had 
contributed from her separate funds to the purchase of the home 
before dividing the proceeds that remained after the 
satisfaction of the mortgages and tax liens and before paying 
other debts of the parties. 
In the case at bar, the marital residence in Devon, 
Pennsylvania was also the principal asset acquired by the 
parties during the period before they separated. Although 
appellant later acquired a residence in Salt Lake after his 
involuntary transfer here with assets acquired since the 
separation of the parties in 1972, it is only fair that if that 
portion of the trial court's decree awarding the Devon property 
to the respondent is to stand, that appellant first be awarded 
an amount equivalent to the separate property he contributed to 
the purchase of the Devon home. This amount should be $23,000, 
$10,000 of which went for the down payment in 1966, another 
$10,000 of which went for improvements in the period 1966-1972, 
and another $3,000 used for repairs in 1972 after the 
separation of the parties (R. 208, 225). 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE OR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND SHOULD BE VACATED. 
The decree of the trial court made an award of alimony 
to respondent in the amount of $500 per month for a period of 
36 months. This monthly amount is twice what the appellant has 
already been paying to the respondent for her support under the 
pre-existing Pennsylvania decree of temporary support for three 
years prior to trial for which there was no showing of hardship. 
Because of the long duration of the residence of the 
parties in Pennsylvania, the continued residence of the 
respondent in Pennsylvania whose only contacts with Utah are 
her two appearances in this action, the fact that the appellant 
only came to Utah when his employment required him to do so, 
the fact that appellant had been supporting his wife and 
children since 1972 under a decree of temporary support issued 
by a Pennsylvania court, and because of the fact that divorce 
proceedings were first begun in Pennsylvania two years prior to 
the present divorce action in Utah, counsel for appellant 
strongly urged the trial court both during trial and at the 
Motion for New Trial to consider the provisions of Pennsylvania 
law in deciding whether any award of alimony was appropriate. 
Until July 1, 1980, just one month before the trial of the 
present action, Pennsylvania law did not allow for any award of 
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permanent alimony after a decree of divorce unless the wife was 
insane. E.g., Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 329 A.2d 483, 488 (Pa. 
1974). It shold also be remembered that the parties had been 
separated since August of 1972 and appellant had already 
provided under decree of the Pennsylvania court, for the 
support of respondent alone, without adding in support for his 
children, over $32,000 by the time of trial (R. 226). 
Moreover, the respondent had begun full time employment in 1976 
and during the calendar year 1979 she had a gross income of 
$16,824. At the time of trial, not including the support money 
she was receiving from appellant, and after deducting federal, 
state and city taxes and social security, respondent still had 
a monthly expendable income of $1,332.02 (R. 266, Defendant's 
Exhibit 9). 
Given the above, it is evident that the delay in the 
Pennsylvania divorce proceedings, which proceedings respondent 
admits she was contesting (R. 268), clearly caused an enormous 
windfall to accrue to the respondent in light of the trial 
court's generous award to her of property and alimony. Unless 
the trial court's award of alimony is reversed, respondent will 
have obtained the best of both worlds, over $32,000 in 
temporary alimony plus a very generous award of property and 
permanent alimony. 
It is also evident that the trial court was impressed 
with the change in Pennsylvania law effective July 1, 1980, 
which allowed an award of alimony for the first time, because 
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on the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, after counsel for 
appellant cited Stambaugh v. Stambaugh for the proposition that 
Pennsylvania law does not allow an award of permanent alimony 
after divorce, the court responded with: "Hasn't the error of 
that decision been changed by act of the legislature?" (R. 
307). Also noted by counsel for appellant, both at the trial 
and at the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, was the 
provision of the new law providing that: 
The provisions of this act shall not affect any suit 
or action pending, but the same may be proceeded 
with and concluded either under the laws in 
existence when such suit or action was instituted, 
notwithstanding repeal of such laws by this act, or, 
upon application granted, under the provisions of 
this act. 
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §103, as amended by Act No. 1980-26, as 
quoted from Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service, 1980, 
Pamphlet No. 1, at page 50. Moreover, although the court 
apparently did not apply Pennsylvania law at all, an award of 
alimony was inconsistent with the terms of the new law. That 
is because 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §501, as amended by Act No. 
1980-26 (the new divorce law) provides: 
The court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable, 
to either party, only if it finds that the party 
seeking alimony: 
(1) lacks sufficient property, including but 
not limited to any property distributed 
pursuant to chapter 4, to provide for his or 
her reasonable needs; and 
(2) is unable to support himself or herself 
through appropriate employment. (emphasis added) 
The trial court's award to respondent of substantial property, 
including the entire Devon real property and approximately half 
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of appellant's stock holdings, together with respondent's net 
monthly expendable income in excess of $1,300 plainly would 
disqualify respondent from receiving an award of alimony under 
even the new Pennsylvania Statute. 
While admittedly Pennsylvania law is not strictly 
binding on the trial court as to an award of alimony given the 
court's jurisdiction over the persons of the parties, still, in 
the exercise of its equitable powers, the court should not have 
completely disregarded Pennsylvania law when there is such a 
close nexus between the parties, especially the respondent, and 
Pennsylvania. 
More importantly, the trial court's award of alimony 
in the present action also was erroneous as an abuse of 
discretion under Utah case law precedents. In perhaps the most 
recent definitive explanation of the purpose of alimony by this 
court, in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, at 147 (Utah 1979), 
it was stated: 
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital 
support; it is intended neither as a penalty imposed 
on the husband nor as a reward granted to the wife. 
Its function is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during marriage and to prevent her from 
becoming a public charge. Important criteria in 
determining a reasonable award for support and 
maintenance are the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife, considering her station in life; her 
ability to produce sufficient income for herself; 
and the ability of the husband to provide support. 
This enumeration of criteria to be considered in 
deciding whether an award of alimony is appropriate and in what 
amount, is significant in its listing of priorities. From its 
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place at the end of the list, it is evident that the ability of 
the husband to provide support only becomes relevant after it 
is determined that the wife does not have sufficient income to 
support herself at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage. Where the separate property or income of the wife 
after divorce allows her to maintain such a standard of living, 
it would be inappropriate to punish the husband and reward the 
wife with a grant of substantial alimony just because the 
husband's income is higher than that of the wife. Read v. 
Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). That is particularly true in 
the present situation where, over the course of the separation 
of the parties lasting almost eight years, the respondent has 
successfully begun to rebuild her separate life with the 
support assistance she received from the appellant. 
The trial court's award of alimony on top of a 
generous property award to the respondent is truly a harsh 
penalty for the appellant to bear after such a long separation 
during which the appellant has supported his children and 
carried the burden of supporting the respondent even though, at 
the time of the separation of the parties, she was a college 
graduate whose children were eleven years old or older, in 
school, and without apparent health problems. It must be 
remembered that the appellant's career was well established at 
the time he married the respondent who can not be said to have 
had any responsibility for helping him in his chosen profession. 
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Furthermore, the respondent was awarded, in addition 
to the real property in Devon, of which appellant only seeks 
his just share, approximately half of the stock holdings of the 
appellant. If the appellant is able to prevail on the present 
appeal, he does not begrudge this award of stocks to the 
respondent, which award, by respondent's own valuation, 
exceeded $53,000 in readily convertible assets at the time of 
trial (Defendant's Exhibit 8). It must also be remembereed 
that the stocks appellant was awarded as his share are pledged 
to Merrill Lynch for the $27,000 or more loan he took out to 
make the down payment on his home in Salt Lake when he moved 
here, which home is still encumbered with a mortgage to Walker 
Bank for $51,000 (R. 222,230). It is thus apparent that the 
respondent has been amply provided for, and that the trial 
court's award of alimony was only made either on the basis of 
the misleading valuations provided in Defendant's Exhibit 8 
admitted over appellant's objection (R. 278), on the basis of 
Defendant's Exhibit 10 which shows inflated living expenses for 
respondent because, on her own admission, it included expenses 
for three or four of her children too (R. 275-76, 280-81), or 
in light of appellant's current salary which has reached its 
present level only after 30 years of professional experience, 
at least the first six and the last eight of which were without 
effective benefit of any of the real support or comfort one 
hopes for in a marital relationship. To now approve the trial 
court's award of alimony would be to countenance an additional 
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burden truly of a punitive nature. In an equitable action such 
as the present proceeding, to neglect such considerations is 
clearly an abuse of discretion not in accord with the evidence. 
Therefore, for failure to even consider the provisions 
of Pennsylvania law, and for failure to properly apply Utah 
precedents, as evidenced by the present patent abuse of 
discretion, the trial court's award of alimony should be 
reversed and vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the failure of the trial court to apply 
Pennsylvania real property law to the home located on 
Schoolhouse Road in Devon, Pennsylvania, the trial court's 
award of that entire parcel of real estate to the respondent 
should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court 
with a direction to apply Pennsylvania law as to that parcel of 
real property. In the alternative, Utah law requires that 
appellant be awarded a value equivalent to that contributed by 
him to the purchase of the Devon real property out of his 
separate funds brought to the marriage. Finally, the trial 
court abused its discretion in this equitable proceeding in 
making an award of alimony to the respondent by not at least 
considering the law of Pennsylvania as to alimony and by not 
properly applying Utah law on the subject. This error should 
be corrected by declaring that respondent is not entitled to 
any award of alimony. 
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DATED this tf~ day of March, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NIELSE & SENIOR 
By ~a};;m W\ ~""== 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of March, 
1981, I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to B. L. Dart, of DART & STEGALL, Attorneys 
for Defendant, at 430 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101. 
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